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Introduction 
‘’For the EU as a whole, the euro is a keystone of further economic integration and a potent 
symbol of our growing political unity. And for the world, the euro is a major new pillar in the 
international monetary system and a pole of stability for the global economy.’’1 These words 
are nothing less than part of the introduction of Joaquín Almunia, Commissioner for Econom-
ic and Monetary Affairs, in a report to celebrate the huge success of the common currency in 
2008: EMU@10.2 And yes, at the time the introduction of the common currency seemed to be 
a huge success. Of course Joaquín Almunia also presented the major challenges for the Mem-
ber States of the Eurozone. The foremost challenges: globalization, ageing and climate change. 
Stronger coordination and surveillance are mentioned in the report to tackle these problems in 
order to become the world-leading area in various fields.3 Despite the challenges of the Euro-
zone, the sun was shining, and almost nobody could predict the outbreak of economic thun-
derstorms.            
 However, during the years 2007 and 2008 heavy clouds occurred above the construc-
tion of the euro. The architecture of the currency was designed and described in the Maas-
tricht Treaty, signed by the leaders of the member states of the European Community on 7 
February 1992. Paul de Grauwe, currently professor at the London School of Economic (LSE), 
used the metaphor of the weather conditions to explain what happened to the Economic and 
Monetary Union since 2007 and 2008.  ‘‘The Eurozone looked like a wonderful construction 
at the time it was built. Yet it appeared to be loaded with design failures. In 1999 I compared 
the Eurozone to a beautiful villa in which Europeans were ready to enter. Yet it was a villa 
that did not have a roof. As long as the weather was fine, we would like to have settle in the 
villa.’’4 In 2007 and 2008 the rain started to fall. And the construction proved not to be ready 
to deal with the rain, named Global Financial Crisis. Since the outbreak of this crisis the Eu-
rozone has been experiencing severe repercussions. The Member States of the Economic and 
Monetary Union experienced more or less three types of crisis: a banking crisis, a fiscal crisis 
and a severe economic crisis. The three crises were connected to each other. Especially the 
countries of the southern parts of the European Union and Ireland faced huge problems. And 
some problems are still there.         
 Although some of these countries are still facing an economic crisis, the past years the 
                                                          
1
 Commission (2008) iii. 
2
 Commission (2008). 
3
 Commission (2008) iii. 
4
 De Grauwe (2013) 1. 
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leaders of the Eurozone proved to be able to come up with ad hoc measures and structural 
reforms in order to save the continuation of the currency. The result:  the euro still exists. This 
thesis will not take a look at why it happened, and we take for granted that only after the out-
break of the Eurozone crisis, the European leaders made strong efforts to save the euro in the 
first place, and created a sustainable currency for the future. The leaders of Europe are still 
trying to reconstruct and redesign the Economic and Monetary Union, in order to create a safe 
and stable system. To return to the abovementioned words of Paul de Grauwe, they are trying 
to repair the design failures of the Maastricht Treaty.     
 The original design of the EMU of the Treaty of Maastricht contained various faults 
and proved to be insufficient to survive major repercussions. Not only economists and aca-
demics like Paul de Grauwe warned about these potential design failures. In retrospect also 
politicians admitted that the construction of the Economic and Monetary Union was not sus-
tainable. For instance, Ruud Lubbers, one of the founding father of the new common currency, 
admitted in the Dutch newspaper Trouw that the creation of the Eurozone was a work in pro-
gress that was never completed. At the time of the creation and the years of transition after 
Maastricht, politicians tended to be undisciplined and unpunctual, according to Lubbers.5 
Wim Kok, Dutch Minister of Financial Affairs during the negotiations, admitted that the lead-
ers of the European Community did not take into account the potential problems of a common 
currency in the design of the Treaty of Maastricht.6      
 Nevertheless, we will not focus on the question why the designers of Maastricht were 
undisciplined or short-sighted. We will rather take a look at what information was available; 
what could they know? And what did they with that? So, the research question of this thesis is 
about to what extent the politicians could know the design faults, and how they responded to 
that information. This it to say how the information was translated into statements, policies 
and proposals.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Trouw, 3 May 2013: Lubbers: de euro blijft een onvoltooid werk. Available at: 
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4504/Economie/article/detail/3435868/2013/05/03/Lubbers-de-euro-blijft-een-
onvoltooid-werk.dhtml)   
6
 Interview with Roel Janssen, author of the book: De Euro (Amsterdam 2012). Available at: 
http://www.ftm.nl/exclusive/we-zij-de-euro-in-gerommeld/  
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I. Literature, objectives and research plan 
As already mentioned in the introduction, among economists and other academics there is 
strong consensus about the very fact that the Economic and Monetary Union of the Maastricht 
Treaty contained several design failures. It is not my task to blame all the responsible actors 
of Maastricht, but it is rather interesting to see whether these actors could know the potential 
problems and how they reacted on this information. In order to focus I will research the posi-
tion of the Dutch government. This introductory chapter serves to take a look at the existing 
literature about the topic and elaborates on how I will find answers on the research questions. 
Academic considerations regarding the EMU and the crisis 
The last few years several economists and academics published about the design failures of 
Maastricht. It’s impossible to discuss all the literature, however I will elaborate of a few 
trends and the foremost academics. During the nineties some studies occurred on the function-
ing of the Economic and Monetary Union. During that decade, but even today, academics and 
economists focused on the functioning of the Eurozone from a perspective of the so-called 
Optimum Currency Area Theory (OCA). The famous economist Robert Alexander Mundell 
was more or less the founding father of this theory, although during the seventies, eighties and 
nineties, much of the theory was not yet interpreted.7 The main research question with regard 
to the application of the theory on the EMU is: to what extent was or is the European Union 
an optimum currency and how could policy-makers prevent the occurrence of a-symmetric 
shocks? When it comes to labor mobility, the EU scores very badly. Other criteria like fiscal 
transfers are more or less absent and forbidden by the Treaty of Maastricht: no bail out, no 
monetary financing.          
 From this perspective one could expect that the designers of the Treaty of Maastricht 
took into account this information and did try to avoid potential problems by creating instru-
ments, institutions or whatsoever. That is to say instruments to adjust a-symmetric shocks in 
case they occur.8 Nevertheless, it did not happen and the OCA Theory was more or less ig-
nored. Barry Eichengreen rightly observes that ‘…the impact on policy-making was limited by 
the fact that the literature focused almost entirely on analytical constructs. There were few 
efforts to apply it to actual or prospective monetary unions like the one about to be construct-
                                                          
7
 De Grauwe (2006) 712. 
8
 De Grauwe (2006) 720. 
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ed in Europe.’9 So, the OCA seemed to be part of academic debate only.   
 Since the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis at lot of attention has been paid to the so-
called design failures. The next chapter will elaborate on four main design failures.  I will not 
only mention and explain the design faults, but also to what extent the contemporary academ-
ic world was aware of these potential design faults. In his very famous article in the Journal 
of Common Market Studies Barry Eichengreen refers to several authors who, at the beginning 
of the nineties, pinpointed potential problems that might occur due to the architecture of the 
EMU.10            
 Recent years, most of the academic literature is about the severe economic repercus-
sions of the Eurozone and the design failures of the Maastricht Treaty. Barry Eichengreen, 
Paul de Grauwe and Maurice Obstfeld are some of the main economists and academics.11 
They do not only stress the design faults, but also try to present potential solutions to redesign 
the architectural fundaments of the Economic and Monetary Union. Also O’Rourke and Tay-
lor emphasized the failing architecture and the lack of application of the OCA-theory during 
the making of the Treaty: ‘’The fact that the eurozone scores so poorly on optimal currency 
area grounds suggests a need for mechanisms allowing smoother and more symmetric ad-
justment between its members.’’12 Maurice Obstfeld, for instance, elaborates on the potential 
ways to reconstruct the design of the EMU. In a very large article he talks about the lessons 
we need to learn from the outbreak of the crisis and what is required to reconstruct the EMU 
in order to make the system sustainable and ready for the future.13 Paul de Grauwe did the 
more or less the same.14         
 Another trend in the literature about the EMU are more general reflections on the pro-
cess towards the ratification of the Treaty. Van Riel and Metten describe and analyze the pro-
cess of negotiations leading up to the Treaty. Their study focusses on key issues of the negoti-
ations, the controversies, the changing positions of the participating states and the dichotomy 
between the Germans and the French. Recently, Alman Metten wrote an article about the ra-
tionale behind Maastricht, and with the terrible developments of the recent years in mind, he 
reflects on the process of Maastricht on a more general level; analytical and less descriptive. 
He argues that Maastricht meant more or less the beginning of drafting the rules of the game 
of the EMU, rather than a final collection of the rules. Maastricht proved to be an insufficient 
                                                          
9
 Eichengreen (2012) 124. 
10
 Eichengreen (2012) 123-125. 
11
 For instance: Eichengreen (2012), De Grauwe (2013) and Obstfeld (2013). 
12
 O’Rourke and Taylor (2013) 186. 
13
 Obstfeld (2013). 
14
 De Grauwe (2013). 
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compromise of the Germans and the French, and it was not sustainable to survive the crisis.15 
Here we return to the words of Paul de Grauwe mentioned in the introduction of his thesis: the 
EMU as a nice house, but without a roof, thus not finished yet.16     
 The introduction already mentioned that the political actors during the age of Maas-
tricht admitted that the design was insufficient.17 Roel Janssen collected a series of interviews 
with the main Dutch actors, active during the negotiations before and during the intergovern-
mental conference (IGC) of Maastricht. Main figures like Minister of Finance Wim Kok, 
Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, Treasurer-General Cees Maas and the President of the Dutch 
Central Bank André Szász reflect in this book on the process and the shortcomings of the 
Treaty.18            
 However, these reflections are not only to be found in literature after the outbreak of 
the Eurozone crisis. Roel Janssen, again, wrote a little booklet on the financial system in 1993, 
just after the ratification of the Treaty. In this booklet he quoted the former President of the 
German Bundesbank, namely Karl-Otto Pöhl. Pöhl, surprisingly, compares the strategy of the 
Treaty of Maastricht to a strategy to win the last war, and not a strategy to win the upcoming 
war. Pöhl argues that Maastricht was the outcome of a terrible hurry of the European leaders; 
it was a well-intentioned reaction to the recent developments of the fall of communism and 
the reunification of Germany, but the Treaty was written too fast. At the time, 1993, there was 
already some awareness about the potential problems of bringing together economically very 
different countries and regions under a single currency. Roel Janssen mentions the example of 
western and eastern Germany: large fiscal transfer were required in order to introduce the 
German D-Mark, flows from the rich to the poor parts, from west to east.  The same should be 
done for the Eurozone.19 This indicates the potential awareness of design failures.  
‘Filling the gap’ 
So we have literature concerning the design failures of Maastricht, and we have more general 
reflections on the process and outcome of Maastricht. What the academic literature more or 
less ignores is the question to what extent the actors could be aware of the potential designs 
faults and if so, how they responded to that ‘warning’ information. The current literature on 
                                                          
15
 Metten (2013) 64-65 and 71. 
16
 De Grauwe (2013) 1. 
17
 For instance Ruud Lubbers: Trouw, 3 May 2013: Lubbers: de euro blijft een onvoltooid werk. Available at: 
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4504/Economie/article/detail/3435868/2013/05/03/Lubbers-de-euro-blijft-een-
onvoltooid-werk.html  
18
 Janssen (2012). 
19
 Janssen (1993) 133-134 and 144-150. 
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the EMU elaborates very extensively on the design faults and also elaborates on the underly-
ing nature of the negotiations process towards Maastricht, but not on the information available 
at that time. If we focus on the literature about the Dutch, we might conclude that much atten-
tion has been paid to the role of the Dutch as mediators between the French and the German. 
Especially when it comes to the final weeks before the IGC of Maastricht; the Dutch really 
wanted to succeed. It seemed as if Lubbers and Kok sacrificed the wishes of the Dutch in or-
der to find compromise.         
 Politicians like Lubbers admitted, in retrospect, that they made wrong decisions and 
did underline the statement that the rules of Maastricht were not sufficient to create a sustain-
able economic and monetary union. Nevertheless, in general the literature ignores the ques-
tion to what extent the political actors were informed about the potential flaws during the road 
to Maastricht, and how they reacted on that information. In other words, how these insights 
were translated into statements of the Dutch government. This thesis aims at filling this ‘gap’ 
in the current literature. And maybe it also fulfills a bit of the wishes of the authors of a very 
recent article in the Dutch Volkskrant: Wat wist de regering over de risico’s van de euro?20 Or: 
what did the Dutch government know? However we are not interest in the ‘why’, why they 
did ignore potential information and potential warnings, but only to what extent this infor-
mation was available and how these insights were translated into statements, policies and po-
sitions. We will not consider what happened with the information and the statements during 
the dynamic process of negotiations. In order to do that, we would require information from 
still closed archives and interviews with all the political stakeholders and diplomats.    
How? Methods 
 How I am going to find answers on these questions? The next chapter will elaborate 
on the general process towards Maastricht, the EMU and the Treaty itself. The chapter after 
that deals with the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis and the design faults that occurred during 
the crisis. So this chapter is more or less the descriptive and analytical basis for this research. 
A very important part of this chapter is the question to what extent the design faults were al-
ready part of academic research. Of course, we cannot blame the designers of the Maastricht 
Treaty for things they could not know. So I will not only describe and explain the design 
faults, but also indicate to what extent the academic world was aware of the potential prob-
lems at the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties.     
                                                          
20
 De Volkskrant, 7 March 2015: Wat wist de regering over de risico’s van de euro? Available at: 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/opinie/wat-wist-de-regering-over-risicos-van-de-euro~a3889486/ 
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 The fourth and fifth chapter are the analytical part of this research. The fourth chapter 
is about the information provided to the Dutch government parties by advisory boards and the 
Dutch Central Bank. Keep in mind that during the period we discuss, namely between 1985 
and 1991, three coalitions were in charge under supervision of Minister-President Ruud Lub-
bers. Lubbers I and Lubbers II were a combination of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the 
Liberals (VVD). Lubbers III was a coalition of the Christian Democrats and Labor (PvdA). 
By advisory boards I mean three types. Firstly, the Social and Economic Council of the Neth-
erlands, or in Dutch: Sociaal-Economische Raad (SER). Then the Scientific Council for Gov-
ernment Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, WRR). And finally, I will 
use some material of the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank or DNB). So this 
chapter elaborates on the question to what extent the Dutch government was informed about 
the design failures. That means that we will focus on the design faults mentioned in the sec-
ond chapter. Then the fifth chapter will shortly go into the reaction of the Dutch government 
and governmental parties with regard to that information. Did they use it? Of did they ignore? 
Therefore I will take a look at official publications, letters to the Dutch Parliament and reports 
of meetings of the States General. Thus, the analysis this thesis is more or less threefold: from 
the design failures in the academic literature, to the advises of the advisory boards and the 
DNB, to the Dutch government.        
 Last but not least, it is a good thing to mention and explain the timespan of this study. 
I will consider the period between 1985 until 1991. Why 1985? That is because this year was 
marked by the publication of the White Paper of Delors on the completion of the internal 
market.21 This report was an important step towards the new Treaty of 1986: the Single Euro-
pean Act. This act merely aimed at the stimulation of the free flow of goods, services, capital 
and people. The Single European Act also hints the convergence of economic and monetary 
policies, thus set a basis for further integration towards an economic and monetary union. So 
the Single European Act provided the legal basis for the transformation of the Common Mar-
ket of the Treaty of Rome (1957) into the Internal Market, and further up to the Economic and 
Monetary Union. This study ends of course in 1991, when the Treaty was written, and ulti-
mately signed in February 1992.  
 
 
                                                          
21
 Commission (1985). 
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II. The concept Economic and Monetary Union and Maastricht Treaty 
The idea and political commitment to create an economic and monetary union were not en-
tirely new. The very start of thinking about the creation of a monetary union was much older 
than the installation of the Delors Committee. In this short introductory chapter we will take a 
brief look at the history of the process of the creation of an economic and monetary union, 
important theoretical matters, and the so-called Maastricht criteria.  
Before the Delors Committee 
Since 1944 the international regime of exchange rates was based on the so-called Bretton 
Woods system. In short, this system meant that the exchange rates were fixed and connected 
to the US dollar. And the dollar could be converted to gold at a fixed price of 35 dollars per 
ounce. However, ‘fixed’ didn’t necessarily mean that any mutations of exchange rates were 
impossible. The exchange rates of other currencies could be adjusted in case it was necessary. 
For more than two decades this global system of fixed exchange rates worked very well. 
However, during the last years of the 1960s the system did not function anymore. Due to the 
immense costs of the Vietnam War, the United States of America was not able to maintain its 
position in the system. As a consequence the system collapsed and participating countries had 
to look for alternative systems.22          
 The countries of the European Economic Community wanted to avoid a situation of 
exchange-rate instability. The states of the EEC thought that this kind of instability would 
cause severe effects on international trade. In a system of free float of currencies trading part-
ners have less certainty regarding the value of foreign currencies and this would cause e de-
creasing levels of trade. This fear and the strong willingness of the political elite to cooperate 
on European level pressed the European leaders to come up with a first attempt to establish an 
economic and monetary union. The problems regarding the administration of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) are an additional factor to clarify the European attempt to avoid 
strong currency fluctuations.23 It seemed that the leaders, or the political elite, of the European 
nation-states wanted to move forward when it comes to economic and monetary integration, 
and ultimately wanted to adopt a single currency for the European Economic Community. 
However, according to Kathleen McNamara: ‘’This occurred despite the lack of either empir-
ical or theoretical proof of the clear necessity of a single currency for the single market to 
                                                          
22
 El-Agree (2011) 163.  
23
 McNamara (2005) 143; McNamara (2006) 173. 
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function efficiently.’’24 Later on, we will return to this kind of eagerness of political leaders.
 At the The Hague Summit of December 1969 the heads of state and government de-
cided to appoint Pierre Werner, the prime minister of Luxemburg, to chair a committee to 
draw a plan for the creation of an economic and monetary union. In 1970 Pierre Werner pre-
sented his so-called Werner Plan. The goal of the EMU looked quite comprehensive and sim-
ple, according to Desmond Dinan: ‘’…fixed exchange rates, a common monetary policy and a 
single monetary authority…’’25 But how to achieve? There was a lot of disagreement among 
the six member states about the ins and outs of the creation of a monetary union. However, 
after a series of negotiations the plan for an EMU was adopted in 1971. Nevertheless it proved 
to be a major failure. Despite good intentions, only one of the three stages was ultimately im-
plemented; the exchange-rate regime, the ‘snake’ was adopted in 1972 (in this system the ex-
change rates might fluctuate within a certain bandwidth) and implemented in 1973. However, 
the system collapsed very soon as a result of the international exchange-rate crisis, and only 
continued to exist for a few countries, connecting their currencies to the German D-Mark.26 In 
1974 the Council failed to continue the project to the second stage. Mutation of the plan didn’t 
make it.27           
 The plan to establish an economic and monetary union collapsed due to several rea-
sons like the outbreak of the oil crisis in 1973, high levels of inflation and other economic 
repercussions. Instead of cooperation and attempts to converge economically, the member 
states of the European Economic Community maintained their own policies to attack the eco-
nomic repercussions.28 The end of the era of Bretton Woods was more or less marked by the 
floating of the German D-Mart in March 1973. It was not only a definitive collapse of Bretton 
Woods, but marked also the beginning of a period of almost five years of disagreement 
amongst the members of the European Economic Community with regard to the solutions to 
tackle the problem of exchange rates.29 Nevertheless, the Werner Report marked more or less 
a new approach towards the idea of economic cooperation. Alfredo Panarella argues that 
‘’The Werner report, in fact, emphasized the insufficiency and incompleteness of the Common 
Market and defined the basic elements for the existence of a full scale EMU.’’30 In retrospect, 
it seemed that the creation of a monetary union with a common currency was only a matter of 
                                                          
24
 McNamara (2005) 143. 
25
 Dinan (2004) 132. 
26
 McNamara (2005) 144; Dinan (2004) 134-135; McNamara (2006) 173; Baldwin and Wyplosz (2012) 385-387. 
27
 Panarella (1995) 20. 
28
 Dinan (2004) 126. 
29
 Issing (2008) 5. 
30
 Panarella (1995) 18. 
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time.            
 The abovementioned system of the snake in the tunnel proved to be a disappointing 
system that persisted for only a few states. These participating countries were prepared to 
connect their currencies to the German D-Mark. During the late 1970s a new European sys-
tem for exchange rates was proposed, the so-called European Monetary System (EMS). I will 
not elaborate on the technical details of this system, but we might conclude that this system 
looked quite similar to the snake in the tunnel. In March 1979 the EMS began to start func-
tioning, and a lot of European countries were participating from that very moment: Germany, 
France, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, the Netherland, Belgium and Luxemburg joined the ex-
change rate mechanism (ERM). Despite some doubts about the system, because it was more 
or less like the disappointing ‘snake’, it proved to be a success. During the initial years of the 
EMS the system was a bit instable, due to the fact that the international financial world was 
worried about the high levels of inflation in France. After a change of the economic and mon-
etary policy of France, the whole system became more and more stable. The success of the 
EMS throughout the 1980s and converging ideas about how to create exchange rate stability 
stimulated a new sense of creating a monetary union.31       
From the Single European Act to the Delors Report 
In 1985, the new elected president of the European Commission Jacques Delors decided that 
it was time for a revival of economic integration. Based on Lord Cockfield’s White Paper on 
the Common Market, Delors pushed for intense economic integration, transforming the 
Common Market of the Treaty of Rome (1957) into the Single Market. The Single European 
Act of 1986, adopted by all member states in 1987, aimed at the completion of the internal 
market. It set an legislative basis to remove trade barriers, and barriers that block the free flow 
of capital throughout the Community. All in all the Single Market Programme of Delors was 
created to fulfill the promising goals of the Treaty of Rome, namely the free movement of 
goods, capital, services and people.32       
 The success of the functioning of the European Monetary System and the Single Eu-
ropean Act, and of course the efforts of a very pro-European Jacques Delors, created an at-
mosphere facilitating further ideas about integration. During the Summit of Hannover in 1988 
the heads of state and government appointed the so-called Delors Committee to draft a plan 
for the creation of an economic and monetary union. The European Council received the De-
                                                          
31
 McNamara (2005) 144; Baldwin and Wyplosz (2012) 394. 
32
 Baldwin and Wyplosz (2012) 24-25 and 499. 
- 12 - 
 
lors Committee Report in June 1989 during the Summit of Madrid. The proposals of Delors 
were rather controversial and deterministic.33According to Charles Wyplosz: ‘’The Delors 
Report goes at great length to present the monetary union as a natural, indeed unavoidable 
consequence of the Single Act.’’34 And Katheleen R. McNamara: ‘’The success of the single 
market programme (…) in moving towards the dismantling of barriers to trade and commerce 
seemed to forge a logical link with a move forward  towards a single currency.’’35 
 The Delors Report delivered more or less a concrete path towards a monetary union. 
The report advises that the economic and monetary union should be implemented by three 
states. And in order to introduce the EMU, Treaty change would be required.36 After the 
presentation and the start of the IGC’s Delors did not hesitate; the horse towards the EMU 
galloped at full speed. And this is where criticism on the EMU-project comes in. The speed 
was too fast and Delors was too eager to move straightforward to a new Treaty. The publica-
tion of the Commission report on the costs and benefits of an economic and monetary union, 
‘One Market, One Money’, came too late according to the observation of Charles Wyplosz. 
The train was at full speed already and didn’t stop. Before the academic world and other spe-
cialists on this topic could react on the proposals of Delors, the negotiations were moving 
towards the draft and signing of a new Treaty. In other words: ‘’The Delors Committee Report 
was transformed into the Maastricht Treaty before views from outside official circles could 
significantly affect key decisions.’’37 And this may have let to major design failures in the 
original architecture of the EMU. The academic world was not able to warn the officials and 
the drafters of the Treaty. At the end of 1991, only two years after the presentation of the De-
lors Report, the Treaty was there.        
 It worthwhile to say something about the dimension of the unification of Germany and 
the impact on process of creating the Economic and Monetary Union. Some scholars argue 
that the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was decisive for the creation of the EMU. 
However, Van Riel and Metten argue that this is not the case. The Summit of Hannover of 
1988 appointed the Delors Committee in order to explore the possibilities for the creation of 
the EMU. And during the Summit of Madrid, a few months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
the first decisions to move on with the creation were made. Nevertheless, the Berlin Wall did 
accelerate the process of decision-making. Van Riel and Metten mention the agreement 
                                                          
33
 Thygesen (1989) 637. 
34
 Wyplosz (2012) 212. 
35
 McNamara (2005) 145. 
36
 Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (1989). 
37
 Wyplosz (2012) 210-211. 
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among Kohl and Mitterrand to set a starting date of intergovernmental conferences (IGC) just 
after the happenings in December 1989 in Strasbourg. Furthermore, the unification of Germa-
ny required political approval of for instance France, of course in exchange for support of the 
German for the common currency. The high costs due to the backward situation of the former 
DDR caused that Germany was not able to stick to the convergence criteria; German’s  deficit 
spending was too high. This damaged the powers of the Germans during the negotiations be-
fore Maastricht.38  
The Maastricht Treaty: Economic and Monetary Union 
The Delors Committee report set a good standard for the change of the Treaty; it was taken 
seriously by the heads of state and government. After a few years of negotiations the Treaty 
was signed in Maastricht in 1991. I will elaborate on the negotiation in the third chapter. On 1 
November 1993 the Treaty on the European Union came into force. The new Treaty was not 
only about the Economic and Monetary Union, but the component ‘EMU’ was, of course, the 
most important. All member states joined the monetary union except the United Kingdom and 
Denmark. Despite the so-called opt-outs the Maastricht Treaty prescribes that all member 
states should join the Eurozone as soon as possible, but only if an individual member state 
would be ready to join.39         
 The rules, regulations, and conditions of the EMU of the Maastricht Treaty are rather 
similar to the Delors Report, although not all details are the same. As Charles Wyplosz ob-
serves: ‘’The Maastricht Treaty faithfully took up nearly all the proposals made in the Delors 
Committee Report.’’40 But what does the Maastricht Treaty describe about the Economic and 
Monetary Union? In fact there are different components. Firstly, the Treaty describes the main 
goal of the creation of the EMU, namely price stability in order to ensure to support the gen-
eral economic welfare of the Member States.41 Furthermore the Treaty describes how the sys-
tem will function, the creation and the role of the ECB (statutes) and the entry-conditions of 
the Eurozone. In Maastricht too, the Member States agreed on a time-path. The entry condi-
tions and the time-path of the economic and monetary union were the two main topics during 
the negotiations before the signing and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.      
 Especially France and Italy wanted to ensure the irrevocability of the EMU and want-
ed to set a number of data towards the completion of the EMU. The member states agreed on 
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a ‘time-path’ of three stages. According to the Treaty, the first stage began on 1 July 1990; the 
start of the liberalization of the movement of capital. Other important components are the 
completion of the functioning of the common market and economic convergence. The second 
stage commenced on 1 January 1994. This stage contained the creation of the institutional 
framework of the Eurozone. That is to say the European Monetary Institute, the predecessor 
of the European Central Bank. This institution aimed at enhancing cooperation between the 
national central banks  This stage was more or less a period of transition before the introduc-
tion of the euro, and therefore, again, there was strong emphasis on economic convergence. 
The final stage, beginning on 1 January 1999 at the latest , was the ultimate introduction of 
the single currency: the euro. This meant that all national currencies were at a certain level, 
the introduction of the euro in the financial system (banks), and finally the physical introduc-
tion of coins and banknotes.42 The heads of state and government ultimately decided, in ac-
cordance with the Treaty, on the exact starting point of beginning of the third stage. But, stage 
three would start automatically on 1 January 1999, if there would be no agreement on this 
date at the end of 1997.43         
 Another major topic of discussion during the negotiations were the entry criteria. Es-
pecially Germany and the Netherlands wanted to incorporate the so-called ‘convergence crite-
ria’. The member states agreed on five criteria in order to enter the Eurozone. Firstly, the in-
flation rate of a Member State might not be higher than 1,5 percentage points of the average 
of three countries with the lowest inflation rates. Secondly, the long-term interest rate (nomi-
nal) should be less than 2 per cent higher than the three countries with the lowest inflation 
rates. Thirdly, the government debt should be lower than 60 percent of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). And the annual budget deficit should be less than 3 per cent of the GDP. An 
additional criterion prescribes that a potential member state of the Eurozone should participate 
in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) for at least two years, without devaluating its cur-
rency. In the end, it would  up to the Council of the EU to decide whether countries might join 
the Eurozone, based on the criteria.44 We should keep in mind that the time-path and the entry 
criteria both were highly disputed during the negotiations before Maastricht.  
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Theoretical character of the Maastricht Treaty 
However, before we move to the design flaws in the original architecture of the EMU, we will 
take a brief look at the theoretical background of the discussions towards Maastricht. This is 
useful to see and explain a bit why different countries took different positions during the ne-
gotations. It seems that the Treaty of Maastricht is more or less an outcome of negotiations 
between countries ‘connected’ to different theoretical schools.  The negotiations before the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty were characterized by a dichotomy between monetarists 
on the one hand and economists on the other.  The last school is also known as ‘behaviorist’. 
 The Dutch and the Germans were more or less supporting the ideas of the economist 
school. That means that they are in favor of a system of convergence before moving forward 
to a monetary union. So: first a long period of harmonization of economic policies, and if 
countries proof to be ready to enter a monetary union, they may enter. In this scenario there is 
no time-path or deadline. Only if a country meets certain levels of convergence it could enter 
the Eurozone. This clarifies why the Germans were so eager to add real quantitative criteria of 
convergence: inflation rate, real interest rate, etcetera. Once a common currency is introduced 
there is no option anymore to adapt the exchange rate. And without this instrument other 
measures are required in order to become competitive, the so-called alternative adjustment 
mechanisms. For instance to lower wages to ensure competitive unit-labor costs. These 
measures are very difficult to implement according to economist view, so they want to rest 
assure that a certain level of economic convergence is reached before losing the instrument of 
exchange rate adaptions. Of course, all this has to deal with the ability of participating mem-
ber state to correct internal imbalances. We will return to this later.   
 The other school consists of the so-called monetarists. The Italians and the French 
were advocates of this school of economic thought. They believed that once the common cur-
rency and institutions were introduced, convergence would be of less importance. The intro-
duction of fixed exchange rate, without taking into account the level of convergence of partic-
ipating states, would automatically mean that politicians opt for measures that restore a cer-
tain balance in the Eurozone; options like reducing deficit spending or lowering wage levels 
in order to keep pace with other participating countries. The monetarist camp opted for the 
irrevocability of the introduction of the EMU, a strict time-path and agenda to introduce the 
new institutions.45         
 Overall the plan of the EMU looks quite economist at first sight. The Maastricht Trea-
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ty lays strong emphasis on the entry criteria and the process of convergence. Meanwhile the 
Treaty set a timetable (the three stages) and is very clear about the irrevocability of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union. So in the end, the Maastricht Treaty is a mix of both economist 
and monetarist elements. We should keep this underlying background when we will take a 
look at the design failures and more in particular the negotiations I will elaborate on in the 
fourth chapter.  
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III. The design failures in the Maastricht Treaty 
Initially the Economic and Monetary Union was a huge success. The system was rather stable. 
The Member States of the Eurozone could profit from a smooth functioning of the payment 
system, a strong and stable common currency, price stability and many other benefits of the 
introduction of the euro. In May 2008 the Eurozone celebrated EMU@10, a decade of success 
of the common currency. Almost nobody could predict that a huge financial crisis in the Eu-
rozone would break out only a few months later. Unfortunately, this crisis proved to be three-
fold. A triple crisis occurred: the sovereign debt crisis, the banking crisis, and the outbreak of 
a deep recession.46           
 The triple crisis was a major test; would the Eurozone survive or not? Due to painful 
measures and strict crisis management the EMU survived. But still; the fundaments of the 
EMU building proved to be weak. The Eurozone crisis revealed some major design flaws in 
the original architecture of the EMU. This chapter will elaborate shortly on the causes of the 
triple crisis. We need this information, because it shows us the weak parts of the design of the 
EMU. The second part of this chapter will closely look at the design flaws.  
The Eurozone Crisis 
What went wrong? We will take a brief look at the facts of the Eurozone crisis in chronologi-
cal order. The outbreak of the Eurozone crisis commenced more or less with the outbreak of 
the Global Financial Crisis in 2007. The fall of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
marked the beginning of a period of financial chaos. In Europe there were already underlying 
problems before the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis. In the first place the high levels 
of public debt in countries like Greece and Italy. These countries never realized a lower debt 
than 60 per cent of GDP, which was nevertheless one of the entry criteria to enter the Euro-
zone. The public debts of the southern countries were much higher than those of Germany and 
the Netherlands. However, the low spreads on the sovereign debt bonds indicated that the 
market was not worried about this situation. The highly indebted countries could borrow at a 
low interest rate. This was not an incentive to restructure public debt or change policies in 
order to reduce public debt. In particular Greece did almost nothing to reduce deficit spending, 
but rather maintained the exceptional benefits of the welfare state. Another major problem was 
the flow of huge amounts of money to the southern states. Due to the introduction of the Eu-
rozone, and liberalization of capital flows, the banks in the southern states could easily bor-
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row from banks of the northern countries. This caused big current account imbalances across 
the zone. These large flows of capital to the south were also facilitated by low levels of inter-
est; it was cheap to borrow money. The flows of capital from the northern banks were used 
for deficit spending of the government.47 Another part of the story, according to Philip Lane is 
that ‘’…lower interest rates and easier availability of credit stimulated consumption-related 
and property-related borrowing...’’48 A large part of this money was used to invest in real 
estate. The investments in real estate caused a property boom. Lane observes that these in-
vestments had little effect on the productivity growth, which meant that countries like Spain 
and Portugal did not become more competitive (despite all the investments).  
 The global financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 caused a tempering of growth expecta-
tions and falling property prices. It became clear that the boom of real estate in for instance 
Spain could not keep pace with the demand of real estate. Less economic activity caused less 
tax revenues for the governments and higher costs due to unemployment (especially Spain). 
Meanwhile the same governments failed to restructure expenditures. In 2009, so two years 
after the outbreak of the financial crisis in the USA, it became clear that countries like Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal were in huge trouble. Greece, for instance, reported a budget deficit of 
12.7 percent in 2009.49 The financial markets overreacted. According to the design of the 
EMU, it’s up the financial markets to discipline the market. The capitalist system itself would 
solve the problems as long as the system could function without barriers. However, the finan-
cial market failed to correct the imbalances.50 Until 2008 and 2009 the spreads on sovereign 
debt were very low, but from 2009 onwards the spreads skyrocketed. The debt-to-GDP ratio’s 
and interest levels on sovereign debt proved to be unsustainable, and over the years several 
bail-outs took place. It was the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis.    
 The financial markets recognized the fragile situation. The banks realized that the real 
value of sovereign debt on their balances was much lower than expected. And they were also 
faced with bad loans of consumers and (large ) enterprises. They had to revise the value of for 
instance the mortgages on Spanish real estate. So both the value of sovereign debt and private 
debt had to be estimated again. After reassessments of the banks, a huge amount of banks 
couldn’t meet anymore the international agreements on for instance tier-core 1 capital-ratio. 
The banks of the northern countries, which were also confronted with huge problems (for in-
stance ING Group and Commerzbank), tried to pull back money from banks of the southern 
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states. Between roughly 2005 and 2008 large sums of money flowed to the banks of the 
southern states, but from 2008 onwards the money traffic was the other way around. This en-
dangered the financial system further; some banks became almost empty shells.51 
 The situation was so dramatic that governments started to nationalize banks. In most 
case the government had no other option. They had more or less only two options: to save a 
bank in trouble or to let collapse the whole financial system. The banking system had expand-
ed rapidly after the introduction of the euro. The banking assets were in some cases larger 
than multiples of the GDP of a country. A lot of banks were so-called ‘too big to fail’. And 
here we notice a combination of weak sovereigns in need of banks buys their sovereign debt 
with weak banks in need of sovereign that would come to the rescue. This phenomenon is 
called ‘deadly embrace’.52 And to mention again: the market overreacted. Jacques Pelkmans 
puts this as follows: ‘’Of course, this alarmed financial markets as well as credit rating agen-
cies, after first having ‘dosed away’ for years. In other words, when risk taking should have 
been ‘priced in’, it was not. Once it was priced in – forced by rating agencies and jittery mar-
kets – it severely worsened the crisis both for banks and national budget authorities.’’53 
 The overall combination of financial and fiscal instability caused severe economic 
repercussions. Banks were not able or willing to provide loans to companies and people to 
buy for instance a house, a lack of confidence of customers, high unemployment rates, aus-
terity measures, and so on and so forth. All this ultimately caused a deep recession of the Eu-
rozone. The debate on the causes of this crisis and how to solve the problems is still ongoing.  
The shortcomings of the Treaty of Maastricht: design failures 
In retrospect we might say that the causes behind the triple crisis could be found in the origi-
nal architecture of the EMU. The Eurozone crisis revealed several design faults in the Treaty 
of Maastricht. Let us try to categorize the main design flaws. In addition I will elaborate on 
the question whether the architectures of the Treaty could be aware of the flaws, based on a 
survey of the contemporary literature.        
 Maurice Obstfeld argues that ‘’Because of the rapid growth in financial markets, sev-
eral distinctive features of EMU have had consequences that were largely unforeseen before 
the single currency’s launch, or that turned out to be even more damaging than could have 
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been predicted then.’’54 That sounds like an ‘adequate’ explanation for the design flaws: ‘un-
foreseen’. We have to make a distinction between officials and leaders who designed the 
Treaty and people from the outside (academic) world of specialists and scholars. So we better 
ask whether the architects of the Economic and Monetary Union could know or not; could 
they be informed by the academic world? Therefore, this part of the chapter explores the de-
signs failures and the position of the contemporary academic literature. We should keep in 
mind the very fact that the academic world published always some years after political devel-
opments.    
Too intergovernmental 
The first failure is not that complicated. The design of the governance structure of the EMU is 
rather intergovernmental. This means that there is no strong supranational body to control and 
supervise the Member State to see whether the state acts according to the Treaty. The Europe-
an Commission has very limited power and states have to supervise each other on the basis of 
the principle of peer pressure. Eichengreen en Wyplosz argue that it is very unlikely that the 
leaders of the different Member States are going to impose sanctions on other leaders; this 
could cause political difficulties in the future. The intergovernmental set-up of the Eurozone 
also explains the lack of institutions to enforce Member States to comply with the rules. In 
absence of strong supranational institutions it could happen that for instance Greece and Italy 
could present results, facts and figures based on creative accounting. Eichengreen argues that 
the idea that the endeavor to comply with the rules (for instance on convergence) would start 
once the EMU was there was a bit naïve.55        
 The power of the existing institutions is limited according to the Treaty. The European 
Commission could only start procedures or give advice. Ultimately, key decisions about the 
further developments of the EMU and to decide whether countries do not comply with the 
rules (and should be sanctioned) are always up the European Council. For instance, the Treaty 
of Maastricht leaves some room to measure and decide whether candidate members meet the 
criteria. They can decide that, although the criteria are not met, a country restructures on a 
good pace).56  In 1994 already, Bini-Smaghi and other scholars argued that the combination of 
a rule with an potential escape to not to fulfill the requirements, could lead diverging interpre-
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tations of the rules of the Treaty. So again, way too intergovernmental.57    
 In the end, only one country did comply with the criteria of Maastricht. All other 
countries could enter due to the soft intergovernmental approach of Maastricht.58 Peer pres-
sure, peer review and unbinding agreements were simple not enough for the adequate func-
tioning of the EMU. Member States did not feel enough incentives to comply with the rules; 
the design of the EMU allowed this attitude.    
Macro-economic imbalances 
Secondly, the architectures of the Treaty focused too much on budgetary surveillance. Espe-
cially the Germans were very eager to maintain fiscal discipline. Accordingly two of the entry 
criteria are about fiscal discipline, namely a debt/GDP-ratio of 60 percent and a maximum 
deficit spending of 3 percent of GDP. If a country fulfill these criteria, and some other condi-
tions, it could enter the Eurozone. The Treaty does not take into account binding standards 
concerning macroeconomic coordination and cooperation. Eichengreen observes that before 
the outbreak of the crisis only Greece was in trouble when it comes to fiscal and budgetary 
discipline: ‘’Elsewhere in the Eurozone periphery, however, budgets had been in balance or 
even surplus before the crisis. Imbalances were concentrated in the private sector.’’59 The 
problems commenced mainly in the sector of private banking and not in the fiscal sphere. 
Nevertheless, the problems of the banks led to fiscal problems due to the very fact that gov-
ernment had to save the banks. The design did not take into account this scenario, but focused 
too much on fiscal discipline, thereby neglecting other dimensions.   
 Divergent macroeconomic trends in the different member states of the Eurozone could 
endanger the zone as a whole. Paul de Grauwe, for instance, mentions the problem of diver-
gences in unit labor costs and inflation. Especially the divergence of unit labor costs had led 
to a loss of competitiveness of the southern countries compared to the northern countries. An-
other major problem were the abovementioned current account imbalances. In general the 
northern countries experienced major surpluses and the southern countries the opposite. These 
divergent macroeconomic trends caused major problems.60 In the end, the ability to correct 
the current account imbalances and the possibility of further deficit spending evaporated. 
 In the absence of the possibility to use the exchange rate or a national interest rate, the 
member states of the Eurozone should search for alternatives, in case of imbalances in the 
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Eurozone.61 One of the main costs of the introduction of the monetary union was the loss of 
the interest rate as an adjustment mechanism. The southern states could borrow at a very low 
real interest rate due to high inflation. One of the main consequences was the occurrence of a 
housing boom, part of a much broader trend of excessive credit growth. This credit growth 
caused higher inflation – notice a kind of a loop.62 This caused huge liquidity shortages of the 
southern states. Because of the loss of the exchange rate mechanism and the standard adjust-
ment mechanism, the interest rate, countries were required to opt for alternative adjustment 
mechanisms, according to the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA). The southern states 
could ‘repair’ the imbalance through the use of the competitiveness channel (generate cash 
flow due to low prices of products and services). However, the design of the EMU lacked 
institutions and policies to do this on an EMU-level or to enforce this; it is up to the Member 
States of the Eurozone to do that. To quote Charles Wyplosz: ‘’’These ‘real criteria’ are no-
where to be found in the list of ‘nominal’ criteria that, after considerable debates (…) were 
incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty and came to be known as the Maastricht convergence 
criteria.’’63           
 Back to the OCA theory. Again, could they know the severe consequences of macroe-
conomic imbalances? Paul the Grauwe argues that during the years of the process towards an 
economic and monetary most academics supported the ideas of optimum currency areas. 
There were widespread doubts about the introduction of a monetary union among academic 
scholars. Already during the 1960s Mundell presented his classical theory about the optimum 
currency areas. In short, this is more or less an assessment to see whether or not it is attractive 
for a state to join a monetary union; that is to say the benefits exceeds the costs of joining. 
According to the OCA theory a state has to satisfy certain criteria or conditions in order to 
join a monetary union. Paul de Grauwe conceptualized the different criteria: symmetry of 
shocks, flexibility and integration.64         
 In case of a shock within the monetary union, there are potential alternative adjustment 
mechanisms; mechanisms in order to stabilize in case of shocks. These are: wage and price 
flexibility, labor mobility and fiscal transfers. The Treaty of Maastricht explicitly prohibits 
fiscal transfers. So, according to this theory, wage and price flexibility and labor mobility are 
required. The Eurozone scores very badly with regard to labour mobility compared to the 
USA, for instance. The people of Europe is less willing to move throughout the Union to find 
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a job. Then price and wage flexibility. Unit labor costs diverged over the years, in favor of the 
northern countries. The policies of the southern countries were not aimed at lowering labor 
costs, wages were too high compared to the northern countries. This caused a major imbal-
ance in the Eurozone. The original architecture of the EMU lacked instruments to repair the 
imbalances on macroeconomic level. Again, the Treaty offers no strong incentives to do so.
 So we might consider that the theory in itself provided different critiques on the design. 
But why didn’t they use this theory? Charles Wyplosz argues that ‘’’Two problems stood in 
the way of making OCA theory the centerpiece of the Delors Report and the deliberations that 
followed its acceptance.’’65 Firstly, the theory was very complicated and not formalized yet. 
The interpretation and understanding of the theory was a work in progress at the time. Sec-
ondly, there were additional problems to analyze to practical conclusions. For instance how to 
measure an OCA index. Wyplosz mentions Eichengreen as one of the first, who started to use 
the OCA, to attempt to make an index.66 Thus, the reaction of the European Commission on 
the Delors Report, One money, one market, emphasized that the OCA theory could be very 
useful, but nevertheless it could not be used to analyze the consequences of the EMU.67 The 
construction of the EMU was at full speed; there was no time to elaborate on the OCA theory. 
Financial integration, national supervision 
The third big design failure is the system for financial integration, the free flows of capital 
across the Eurozone, without creating a framework of supervision on a level above the Mem-
ber States. Firstly, there was a lack of institutional powers to control and to supervise the 
banks. The Eurozone contained no banking union. Supervision of the banks was left to the 
national authorities.68 Capital requirements, for instance, differed throughout the Eurozone. 
The introduction of a single currency stimulated cross-border flows of capital and credits. The 
balance sheets of the European banks grew rapidly during the 1990s and the first decade this 
century. The balance sheets of a lot of banks exceeded multiple times the GDP of the country 
of residence. At the time the banking system failed and big banks like Santander, ING, and 
many others, had to be saved by national governments for a simple reason: ‘too big to fail’. 
The governments became responsible for the huge liabilities of banks, way too big for most 
countries, instead of a shared burden.       
 Since it was very unusual that banks go bankrupt in Europe, governments felt more 
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obliged to rescue banks in case of emergency. This approach of European governments en-
hanced the problem of moral hazard; if a banks is big enough, the government will automati-
cally come to the rescue. Bankers abused this situation and took way too large risks –lets 
gamble!69 And problems in one country could lead to problems in other countries, due to fi-
nancial integration and big banking; the problem of contagion. The collapse of a bank in for 
instance Greece meant that banks in other countries had to amortize. Consequently, these 
banks were in hit as well.          
 In the end, the taxpayer and the depositor paid the price for the misbehaving an mis-
management of the banks and the lack of coordination, supervision and collective programs 
on a union level. The European Central Bank focused too much on price stability. Many of 
the other tasks were left to the national central banks, which didn’t do their supervisory job 
very well. In order to summarize this problem, Baldwin and Wyplosz quote a former board 
member of the ECB, namely Padao-Schioppa, to express this problem: ‘’A normal central 
bank is a monopolist. Today’s Eurosystem is, instead, an archipelago of monopolists.’’70 And 
ccording to Barry Eichengreen: ‘’This revealed the contradiction between a single currency 
and single financial market, on the one hand, and 17 separate national bank regulators, on 
the other. National regulators at neither the lending nor the borrowing ends of intra-eurozone 
imbalances had adequate incentive to take the cross-border implications of lax domestic 
regulation into account…’’71         
 If we compare this situation to the USA, we notice that there are collective programs, 
collective deposit insurance and other permanent existing options to rescue a bank. The Euro-
zone had none of these options or instruments. If a bank fails, the tax payer or the depositor is 
the victim.72 In a fully operating banking union, a huge amount of money is reserved for even-
tual rescue operations. This prevents the occurrence of ‘deadly embrace’: weak sovereigns 
rescuing weak banks, and weak banks rescuing weak sovereigns.73 A banking union makes it 
possible to solve the banking problems on a union scale, sharing the costs instead of weak 
sovereigns forced to nationalize banks in trouble.74      
 But could they know? Barry Eichengreen and Maurice Obstfeld signalize that at the 
beginning of the nineties, yet before the introduction of the EMU, some scholars already 
warned about the potential consequences of the proposed EMU-model. In 1992, Folkerts-
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Landau and Garber argued that the financial system should be repressed; common rules, 
standards, requirements and supervision were inevitable. Otherwise the ECB would be forced 
to step in with emergency liquidity in case of liquidity problems, to save the banking system. 
And indeed, it sounds strange that bank resolution and bank regulation were left to national 
authorities, and meanwhile these national authorities didn’t have instruments like money crea-
tion or a role of lender of last resort. In retrospect, they were right; the ECB was forced to 
provide emergency funding, a role of lender of last resort. And that was not the initial role the 
designers of the Maastricht Treaty had in mind. Furthermore, Obstfeld paraphrases David 
Begg and other scholars who already emphasized ‘this gap’ in the framework before the start 
of the second stage of the EMU.75         
 Most of the critique originated in older theories. Let us focus on the theoretical back-
ground. The mix of financial stability, cross-border financial integration and national financial 
policies and supervision seems to be incompatible. This is the so-called ‘financial trilemma’. 
Schoenmaker, using different models, observes that national financial policies become less 
effective if financial integration increases. A combination of two of the above-mentioned 
conditions is possible, but three not.  He made his assumptions based on older ideas of R.A. 
Mundell.76 So we might conclude that the designers of the EMU more or less ignored the old 
ideas about the incompatibility of fixed exchange rate stability, free movement of capital and 
national monetary policy. Part of the last-mentioned is supervision of the system. 
No crisis management and tools 
Last but not least, the lack of a mechanism for crisis management. After the outbreak of the 
Eurozone crisis it became clear that the EMU lacked the tools to forcefully implement poli-
cies that could solve the problems; that is to say preventing states or banks from going bank-
rupt (again the crisis showed us the interconnectedness between the two). In absence of these 
tools and mechanisms, the leaders of the Member States had to agree repeatedly on rather ad 
hoc measures and panic management. The Treaty of Maastricht did not contain the right tools 
and possibilities.77 In general, the Maastricht Treaty comprises mainly articles about how to 
prevent a crisis, especially the convergence criteria. Marco Buti and Nicolas Carnot argue that 
one could find more or less no tools, regulations, procedures or whatsoever in the original 
architecture of the economic and monetary union.; its only about preventing crisis, and not 
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about solving a crisis.78         
 The Eurozone crisis caused that several states, like Greece and Portugal, were not able 
to borrow money on the international financial market at sustainable levels of interest. The 
financial market overreacted, as described in the first part of this chapter, and was not willing 
to lend anymore to these countries. This is the so-called a ‘sudden stop’. Before the introduc-
tion of the common currency, states could make use of the national central bank in order to 
create money in case of emergency. However, the introduction of the EMU had the severe 
consequence that states could not use this tool anymore. The role of the national central banks 
as lenders of last resort did not exist anymore.79      
 The alternative could be twofold: fiscal transfers within the Eurozone, in order to pro-
vide countries like Greece with cash, or inflationary debt monetization, that is to say: to print 
extra money. However, the Maastricht Treaty is very clear about these solutions: prohibited.80 
Article 104b says that member states are not responsible for the finances of other member 
states. The article prohibits to assume the debt of other member states. This is the so-called 
bail-out clause.81 In addition, the Maastricht Treaty does not provide a framework for a Mem-
ber States to leave the Eurozone. Thus this combination of no bail-out and no exit ultimately 
makes it that there are no other options than a search for alternatives. The risks of contagion 
were underestimated; so the crisis in Greece, Ireland and other southern countries caused cri-
sis in the northern states through contagion.       
 The other abovementioned solution of debt monetization of deficits is also prohibited 
in the Treaty of Maastricht. Buti and Carnot argue that the drafters of the Treaty expected that 
the market would regulate and discipline the policies of the Member States. It did not happen. 
And once it happened, the markets overreacted.82 Nevertheless, already during the beginning 
of the nineties Bini-Smaghi and others warned that the perceptions of the financial markets of 
the financial outlook of a country are not always translated into the right levels of interest for 
instance. The free market simply functions not always adequate.83 The lack of crisis manage-
ment caused huge troubles throughout the Eurozone. Without an adequate framework for cri-
sis management, there was a lot of delay in solving or attacking the immense problems, due to 
negotiations between disagreeing states. Ad hoc measures saved the Eurozone, but neverthe-
less, the reconstruction of the EMU is still a work in progress.   
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 Could the know? The academic literature at the time of the Maastricht Treaty does not 
provide extensive analyses regarding the topics of crisis management. The original designers 
of the Treaty could take a look at the system of the successful monetary union of the USA. 
O’Rourke and Taylor offer us an comparative overview of some important different monetary 
unions throughout history. The USA has the instrument of debt monetization84 Of course, debt 
monetization could cause high levels of inflation. So especially Germany was against this tool. 
A fiscal union, more or less a logical new step alongside the road of crisis management, was a 
bridge too far. Price stability, that is to say low inflation, was the main concern of the Ger-
mans (and Dutch) during the design of the EMU. Nevertheless, the expectation that this kind 
of crisis management and other tools were not required due to the free working of the finan-
cial market, was a major miscalculation.        
 So we have four big design fault in the original design of the Economic and Monetary 
Union. This is actually a lot, and anno 2015 there is still a lot of work to be done to repair. 
Nevertheless, we should not look at the future only; we might ask why all this this could hap-
pen. And we could ask why all this information about the potential faults was more or less 
ignored by the architects. Again, Barry Eichengreen observes that ‘’…the impact on policy 
making was limited by the fact that the literature focused almost entirely on analytical con-
structs. There were few efforts to apply it to actual or prospective monetary unions like the 
one about to be constructed.’’85 This is more or less an overall conclusion. The next chapter 
will elaborate on the Dutch case. What did governmental advisory boards and institutes know 
about the potential design faults in the Treaty of Maastricht?  
Summarizing table 1 
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Design failures Part of academic litera-
ture? 
1. Too intergovernmental, causing insufficient 
compliance with the (fiscal) rules 
Yes 
2. Too much focus on budgets, less on other mac-
ro-economic imbalances  
Yes, the OCA theory 
3. Financial integration, though maintenance of 
national supervision 
Yes, though not explicit 
‘banking union’ 
4. Lack of crisis management and mechanisms No, only vague 
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IV. What could the Dutch government know? The advisory boards 
The previous chapter elaborated on the question to what extent the architectures of the Treaty 
of Maastricht could know the design failures, based on contemporary literature. This chapter 
is the second step and will elaborate on the role of the advisory boards of the Dutch govern-
ment. To sum up: the Sociaal Economische Raad (SER), the Central Plan Bureau (CPB), the 
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) and the Nederlandsche Bank 
(DNB). I will categorize the advices and comments of the four institutions under the four de-
sign faults in order to draft conclusions per design fault to what extent the Dutch government 
was informed.      
General observations 
However, let us first make some brief observations about the advises of the abovementioned 
institutions in general. This serves to see the overall attitude of the advisory boards towards 
the EMU, the years between 1985 and 1991. In June 1988 the European Council decided to 
appoint the committee of Delors in order to explore the possibilities to create an economic and 
monetary union. Nevertheless, the ideas about a common currency were much older, so the 
advises concerning more economic and monetary integration were already there before Han-
nover and the Delors Committee.86 The advises after the publication of the Delors Report in 
1989 were more or less reactions on that report. In particular, the publication ‘Advies Econo-
mische en Monetaire Unie (advies 1990/22)’, of the SER in 1990 was a reaction on that report 
and more or less the foremost source of advice for the Dutch government.87  
However, first some general observations. We might conclude that there was not that 
much attention for the creation of the EMU shortly after the introduction of the Single Euro-
pean Act in 1986. After 1989 the attention increased. The Dutch Central Bank (DNB) did 
report regularly about the progressive plan for the creation of an EMU. But the Centraal Plan 
Bureau (CPB) did not publish at all on the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union. 
The WRR and the SER did report on a quite regular basis. However, not every single year 
these institutions did write about the plans. The SER reported about the creation of the EMU 
in four of the seven annual report between 1985 and 1991. Nevertheless, the WRR and espe-
cially the SER did write some very specific and extensive reports about the EMU, in particu-
lar about the costs and benefits of this plan.  
 In general the abovementioned institutions were very positive about the EMU. The 
WRR regarded the EMU as another logical step towards the completion of the internal market. 
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The Single European Act was still not enough; in order to let the internal market function 
properly, economic and monetary cooperation would be necessary.88 States would join the 
common currency if benefits exceeds the costs. I will not elaborate the potential costs and 
benefits and costs, but the WRR– author F. van der Ploeg – summarizes these as following:  
‘’The calculus of participation (Hamada, 1985, Chapter 3) argues that an individual country 
will join a European Monetary Union when the benefits from participation (such as from the 
reduction in exchange rate uncertainty, the increase in bargaining power as a group, and the 
use of a common currency) exceed the costs (such as giving up an independent monetary poli-
cy).’’89 
In addition, the WRR argued in a report in 1989 that the creation of the EMU was al-
ready behind pace. In 1979, the Werner Plan, failed, but the intentions were still there.  The 
WRR also realized that the Netherlands was way too small to influence coordination on 
world-scale. The open Dutch economy, the increase of international capital flows and the 
growth international trade created the awareness that coordination was necessary. To influ-
ence international coordination, the Dutch should opt for European economic and monetary 
integration. As a strong block, the Europeans could influence coordination and policy on a 
world level.90 Many of the reports referred to the so-called Werner Plan of 1979 and regarded 
the plans of Delors as a re-launch of the original plans of Werner. The plans, introducing a 
common currency in phases, looked quite similar. The Delors Committee re-introduced more 
or less the postponed plans of Werner, thereby fulfilling the idea of further European integra-
tion. The internal market and the creation of a common currency had been on the agenda for 
decades; it was like utopia, but now was the moment to realize it.91   
 The WRR argued that the creation of the EMU was not only the fulfilling of utopia, 
but also the only option. Due to the open character of a small economy like the Netherlands, it 
should be part of a bigger entity. Nevertheless, the organization was aware of the very fact 
that during times of elections government parties generally are not willing to propose interna-
tional coordination that will lead to convergence, if this could lead to costs for the people.92 
The SER was also very much in favor of the idea of a common currency. The SER focused in 
some of its report for instance on the disadvantages for the Dutch trade and industries of the 
fluctuations of the exchange rates. More stability would be necessary to enhance the position 
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of the open Dutch economy. However, a common currency would not only mean more stabil-
ity and less exchange rate risks – no more exchange rate fluctuations within the Eurozone – 
but also less cost due to transactions of currencies.93      
 In 1988 the SER showed some worries about the question to what extent the Europe-
ans could compete with Japan and the USA. According to the SER, the European Market was 
still fragmented, the internal market not yet completed, and due to the still existing borders the 
costs for trade and industries too high. The completion of the internal market and the creation 
of one economic and monetary entity, by creating a common currency, would enhance the 
position of the Europeans vis-à-vis the USA, Japan and other strong economic blocks. The 
Cecchini report estimated a growth of GDP of approximately five percent, by completing the 
internal market only. The SER argued that the national governments should speed up deci-
sion-making and should be willing to take hard measures and decisions.94 And the Dutch gov-
ernment should base decision-making on the developments of the creation of the common 
currency.95           
 The creation of the Economic and Monetary Union is more or less regarded as a natu-
ral consequence of the Treaty of Rome: more cooperation between the different nations of 
Europe. The WRR argues that the country does not have an alternative to enhance economic 
and administrative integration than the creation of an EMU; it’s just another logical step of 
European integration which could be very beneficial for the open economy of the Nether-
lands.96           
 Another observation concerns the time-path of the project. In general, the advisory 
boards of the Dutch government emphasized the need for quick action. The open character of 
the Dutch economy required increasing integration in order to compete on a world scale. One 
of the main points of negotiation was the time-path of the stages towards the final introduction 
of the currency. The second chapter already elaborated on the dichotomy between the Ger-
mans on the one hand and the French on the other hand. The first did not want to write down a 
strict time-path, as the French were really eager to do that. In 1990 the SER advised the Dutch 
government that was not yet possible to set a definitive time-path because the criteria of tran-
sition were not formulated yet. The SER recognized the political motivation of some states to 
set a final datum of introduction of the common currency, but emphasized that fulfilling the 
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criteria are of main importance.97        
 Last but not least something about the composition of the states constituting the Euro-
zone. The design of the Treaty prescribes more or less that all member states of the European 
Union should join the Eurozone. Of course, only if an individual Member State meets the cri-
teria of the Treaty. However, the WRR doubted in 1989 whether it’s a good idea to create one 
monetary union for Europe as a whole. The WRR presents the possible alternative, proposed 
by Rudiger Dornbusch, of a separate approach between the northern and southern states. This 
could be more sensible to make sure that the levels of competitiveness within the different 
currency areas would be stable and not diverging.98 
From the EMS to EMU 
An additional observation is that many of the reports between 1985 and 1991 still focus on the 
system of the EMS. The European Monetary System was created to enhance monetary stabil-
ity. The EMS was an important part of the conditions to enter the Eurozone. Already men-
tioned in the second chapter: according to the Treaty of Maastricht, participation of the Euro-
zone requires active and successful participation of the EMS (that is to say without devalua-
tion or revaluation). So, not surprisingly, the EMS is an important part of the analysis of the 
advisory boards. The maintaining of stable exchange rates and the growth of international 
capital flows is often approached in the reports from the perspective of the EMS. Nevertheless, 
the EMS was presented as a scientific experiment or proof the support for the next step. In 
other words: the success of the EMS was one of the main factors in favor of the idea of De-
lors.99            
 The European Monetary System proved to be a stable system. The Dutch focused 
mainly on the policy of the German Bundesbank. The German D-Mark was stable and by 
connecting the Dutch guilder, the Dutch profited from that stability. Nevertheless, the WRR 
expected a limited role of the German on a world level. The German role as a ‘key currency 
country’ meant a status quo on an international level. More integration and expansion of EMS 
system were required to keep pace with economic blocks like the USA, Japan and other up-
coming big countries. The creation of an EMU was just a logical step.100   
 The Dutch Central Bank (DNB) reported in 1985 that the EMS functioned very stable, 
despite some adjustments. The stability of the system could be explained by real convergence 
                                                          
97
 SER (1990b) 59. 
98
 WRR (1989b) 139. 
99
 For instance: WRR (1989a) 45 and 101. 
100
 WRR (1989a) 65-66 
- 32 - 
 
of economic developments of the participating states. The elements of convergence were re-
garded as important conditions for more monetary cooperation. And the functioning of the 
EMS enhanced confidence about the possible creation of an economic and monetary union. 
During its presidency of the Monetary Committee the DNB signalized a general sense of will-
ingness to start talks about the creation of an economic and monetary union.101  
 According to the SER the internal market could only function properly if the wish to 
create an economic and monetary union would be fulfilled during the next years.102 The SER 
advised the government from the perspective that the EMS ultimately should be the funda-
ment for the creation of a common market. Existing institutions should be reformed and pre-
pared for the common currency. The SER mentioned the ultimate institutional example: the 
current European Monetary Cooperation Fund should be replaced by a kind European Mone-
tary Fund (Europees Monetair Fonds) with additional powers and competences. And, in turn, 
this institute should be the forerunner of a European Central Bank.  Thus, here we notice the 
quite deterministic approach of the SER.103 
Too intergovernmental 
‘In the general macroeconomic field, a common overall assessment of the short-term and me-
dium-term economic developments in the Community would need to be agreed periodically 
and would constitute the framework for a better coordination of national economic policies. 
The Community would need to be in a position to monitor its overall economic situation, to 
assess the consistency of developments in individual countries with regard to common objec-
tives and to formulate guidelines for policy.’104 This was the general approach of the Delors 
Committee. The approach was more intergovernmental than supranational. They preferred the 
principle of subsidiarity and a strong role for the Council, instead of the creation of strong 
supranational institutions to supervise the performances of the Member States. 
In general the SER was aware of potential creative interpretations of excessive deficit 
spending. The participating states should formulate very clear standards, procedures and rules 
in order to avoid possibilities for excessive deficits. With regard to deficit spending and debt 
levels the SER offered different potential solutions, based on the ideas of the Monetary Com-
mittee. The SER emphasized that a common budget policy would not be necessary. And the 
advisors wanted to leave some space for the participating states to correct or stabilize short-
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term imbalances by ‘using the tool of deficit spending’. Nevertheless the SER was really ea-
ger to note that binding rules and procedures would be required, and possibilities to impose 
sanctions in case of breaking the rules.105        
 In 1991 the Dutch Central Bank argued that it is very important to avoid flexible inter-
pretation of the criteria in. The consequence of the creation of an economic and monetary 
union is the transfer of some power to a supranational power or authority. Nevertheless, the 
transfer of sovereignty is limited. The criterion with regard to deficit spending, for example, 
contains to some extent a bandwidth. Deficit spending is allowed, but with a maximum of 
three percent of GDP. Budgetary policy and power is left to the participating member state, 
but monetary policy would be transferred to the ECB. So, the overall structure is rather inter-
governmental. According to the DNB, it is very important to maintain strict criteria and leave 
no room for creative interpretation.106       
  The SER, for instance, argued for more obliged coordination procedures. The 
procedures for coordination and convergence were still too voluntary. According to the SER it 
was desirable to coordinate more strictly in order to meet the goals of economic convergence 
and coordination. In a very extensive report about economic and monetary cooperation the 
SER argued that further convergence is not assured without enhancing the procedures for 
economic and monetary cooperation. Coordination should be the key to tackle problems on a 
European level, but also on a national level; because it becomes increasingly difficult to solve 
problems like unemployment, when the internal market functions more properly and the fi-
nancial market becomes more and more open and liberal.107 
 
Macro-economic imbalances 
The main criteria of the Maastricht Treaty focus very much on deficit spending and the max-
imum level of debt. Surveillance in order to maintain the formulated goals was one of the 
main objects of the Treaty of Maastricht. However, the Treaty does not focus on other param-
eters like the labour market and other variables that expose potential economic imbalances in 
the zone. I will sum up different observations of the boards, in order to prove the awareness of 
dangers of macro-economic imbalances. There is no chronological order, but I tried to catego-
rize the advises to some extent.        
 However there was awareness of these issues amongst the advisory boards. Neverthe-
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less, the focus on budgets  was very pregnant. In particular, the SER focused very much on 
budgetary discipline. The committee approached macro-economic policies of the participating 
member states, mainly from the perspective of the government budget (deficit spending).108 
Though, besides, one of the main concerns of the SER was the very fact that due to the loss of 
the exchange rate mechanism, imbalances should be prevented and, in case of an imbalance 
should be repaired by other ‘tools’, the so-called alternative adjustment mechanisms: wage 
and price policy, labour mobility and fiscal policy. In 1990 the SER referred to the Delors 
Report by paraphrasing different causes of imbalances. Firstly, different reactions on the pro-
cess of  restructuring due to increasing integration. Secondly, different impacts of externalities 
on the different national economies. Furthermore, there are diverging trends when it comes to 
the developments of labour costs and other types of costs. And last but not least the different 
economic policies of the member states. Without the disciplinary working of the balance of 
payments and, thus, the exchange rate, imbalances could occur. The SER argued that more 
binding coordination would be required in order to prevent and correct imbalances.109 
 However, the SER concluded that the Delors Report was rather vague about how to 
coordinate national policies in order to prevent divergences. And indeed, if we take a look at 
the Delors Report, we might conclude that the report emphasizes the need for more economic 
cooperation several times, but remains rather vague on how.110 The report focuses on the de-
velopments of the wages and labour mobility; ‘’Wage flexibility and labour mobility are nec-
essary to eliminate differences in competitiveness in different regions and countries of the 
Community. Otherwise there could be relatively large declines in output and employment in 
areas with lower productivity.’’111 But how to create a certain level of convergence is unclear: 
monitoring and more coordination, but still non-compulsory. The Delors Report mentiones 
‘new procedures’, but exclusively focusses on fiscal and budgetary policies.112 And although 
the SER was very much in favour of more macro-economic coordination, the committee re-
mained rather vague, just like the Delors Report. The SER argued that the Member States 
should have to negotiate about to what extent national competences should be transferred to a 
supranational levels. Thereby, the SER maintained the principle of subsidiarity: only transfer 
of competences, if necessary.113 Nevertheless, the SER was aware of the importance of unit 
labours costs. But, instead of emphasizing the importance of convergence within the Euro-
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zone, in order to prevent imbalances, the SER stressed the need for maintaining the Dutch 
very competitive.114          
 The WRR in 1989, for instance, emphasized the need for more coordination between 
the member states on economic level. That is to say wage levels, fiscal harmonization, etcet-
era. The advice is from the perspective of the EMU at the end of the horizon, but mainly for 
the functioning of the European Monetary System. This system was doing well at the time 
and the WRR argued that more coordination could improve the system further. That, coordi-
nation, is to say convergence of national policies and harmonization of rules and standards.115 
The completion of the internal market, liberalization of the capital market, fixed exchange 
rates, and the increase of structural funds could, after a process of convergence, lead to the 
creation of a monetary union. Here we notice again the position of an advisory board with 
regard to the EMU: it should be the final destination of the process of integration.116  
 In addition, the SER advised in 1990 that further economic convergence was one of 
the foremost conditions to move on with the project. Although, the SER argued that setting a 
time-path is very important to speed-up the process and to make the creation an irrevocable 
fact, but the start of the third stage could be postponed if the necessary convergence is not 
sufficient. The economic statistics, policies, and future prospects should be on a similar level, 
and macro-economic imbalances in the zone should be avoided.117    
 In addition the WRR laid strong emphasis on two big issues before the start of the 
EMU in 1992. The WRR argued that coordination of monetary policy alone was not sufficient. 
And convergence and coordination of fiscal policies were also necessary. Though it was 
vague whether it was about direct or indirect taxes. In a report in 1989 the WRR was very 
clear about the desirability of convergence and coordination. However, the WRR did not 
elaborate on that. Questions like how, what, when, etcetera with regard to these key concepts 
remain unanswered.118 In 1988 the SER also emphasized be need for more coordination of 
budgetary policy and wage policy in order to enhance further monetary cooperation and thus 
to strengthen the EMS.119          
 Furthermore the WRR argued that functioning of the common market is crucial for the 
eventual functioning of an Economic and Monetary Union: ‘The completion of the European 
Common Market leads to more identical structures and therefore may facilitate the movement 
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of the European Community towards an optimal currency area.’120 The WRR did not elabo-
rate of how the completion of the common market would lead to an OCA. And maybe this 
was a bit shortsighted. Of course, the EMU could function better to the degree there is ‘more’ 
OCA, but, unfortunately, the WRR presented only rather general ways to ‘create’ an optimum 
currency area; if the internal market would be completed, this would automatically lead to an 
OCA. To sum up: the SER and WRR hammered very much on the completion of the internal 
market and more coordination and convergence.      
 Now back to the OCA theory. At the time, as mentioned in the second chapter, there 
was a lack of consensus and in general a lack of knowledge to interpreted the Optimum Cur-
rency Area Theory, and the WRR was rather vague how coordination of monetary policy and 
economic convergence would enhance an optimum currency area. Based on scientific litera-
ture of Basevi and Giavazzi, Van der Ploeg of the WRR stated in addition that economic con-
vergence and coordination of monetary policies in itself was not enough:  ‘’…coordination of 
monetary policies within Europe will facilitate the movement towards monetary union in Eu-
rope only as long as the European economies are hit by identical shocks and have identical 
structures.’’121 Here we notice the awareness of the application of the OCA theory. 
 The reports of the advisory boards did warn about the potential dangers of macro-
economic imbalances. The WRR for instance, emphasized that Member States would lose 
their exchange rate mechanism , so they should focus on remaining or becoming competitive. 
‘However, if there is unemployment, wages are inflexible and the exchange rate cannot be 
devaluated, one must rely on fiscal action to fight unemployment…’122Fiscal policy is just one 
of the options.            
 There are more methods. The SER argued that the developments of the wages should 
be controlled in a disciplinary way. That is to say no high increases of the wages. However, 
the SER was also aware that wage policies were not always the best mechanism of adjustment. 
It could endanger socials cohesion and solidarity. The board opted for possible solutions on a 
communal level, although the SER remained vague about what instruments could be imple-
mented; freeriding and other tools that endanger discipline of the states should be avoided.123 
 Then back to fiscal adjustment mechanisms. The SER emphasized the possibility to 
use fiscal instruments by the national governments. And here again, we might notice some-
thing like ‘tunnel vision’, a rationale that diverging (labor) costs could be solved by using the 
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fiscal instruments. But what if other member states with lower (labor) costs also implement 
lower fiscal burdens? The SER mentioned the intention of the Community to harmonize direct 
taxes like value added tax (VAT). A good thing, according to the SER, in order to complete 
the internal market. Now they focused changed to direct taxes. Member States could become 
more competitive by changing direct tax policies. However, this change of policies has also 
disadvantages, according the SER. Effecting solidarity for instance. Unfortunately the SER 
did not translate this observations into concrete recommendation for the national govern-
ment.124 In addition the WRR also emphasized the possibility to use fiscal  tools in order to 
become competitive, could cause a race to the bottom.125     
 The WRR emphasized that there is a strong case for the creation of an economic and 
monetary union in a world without externalities and severe unemployment. However, this 
could never be the case. In a monetary union the participating states lose the tool of the ex-
change rate to enhance the levels competitiveness in order to reduce unemployment. That 
means that other ways are necessary to stabilize the imbalances within the monetary union. 
According to the OCA theory there is a strong need for price and wage flexibility, and labor 
mobility to correct the imbalances and to restore stability. In retrospect the high relative high 
unit labor costs of the southern member states of the Eurozone proved to be a disaster and 
obstructed the restoration of inter-Eurozone balances. Besides the WRR warned for the need 
for flexible adjustment of wages: ‘’However, when certain areas of Europe are depressed and 
suffer from unemployment and wages do not adjust immediately to clear all labour markets, 
the case for a European Monetary Union is much weaker, especially as there is little mobility 
of labour between the member states of Europe.’’126     
 The Dutch Central Bank was also worried about the potential loss of the exchange rate 
mechanism to correct imbalances. Due to this loss, the participating should focus very in-
tensely on the developments of the wages. Diverging unit labor costs throughout the zone 
could endanger the zone as a whole. The rationale behinds this, was that the DNB wanted to 
avoid (fiscal) transfers from the more wealthy areas to less wealthy areas. That meant that the 
DNB was not in favor of eventual fiscal transfers. Thus, besides the importance of control of 
deficit spending, the participating member states should coordinate and converge when it 
comes to for instance wages and other criteria of the OCA theory. And, of course, this would 
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affect, to some extent, the sovereignty of the participating states.127    
 However, although it seemed that coordination and convergence were the main con-
cerns of the Dutch, in order to avoid imbalances in the future Eurozone, the SER wanted to 
maintain the policy for wages and prices on a national level. Due to the creation of the com-
mon currency, the ‘disciplinary tool’ of the balance of payments will not exist anymore. 
Hence, it will be very important that participating states have similar statistics like unit labor 
cost in order to avoid too large gaps of competitiveness. Coordination, not only on a voluntary 
basis, is required, but, nevertheless, the SER wants to keep that on an intergovernmental lev-
el.128 Although the SER was, like the DNB, against fiscal transfers, the committee opted for 
enhancing the economies of these (southern) states through the programs of regional policies. 
The programs should enhance structural reforms and improvements in order to make these 
regions competitive.129          
Lack of international supervision 
Not surprisingly, the Dutch Central Bank focused on the developments with regard to the lib-
eralization of the international capital market. The SER and WRR did not advise about this 
topic. The Netherlands was one of the leading countries when it comes to the liberalization of 
the international market for capital and credit. And the DNB supported the idea to harmonize 
the standard and rules, and  mainly the supervision of the banking system.130 The DNB sup-
ported this principle in 1985. A few years later, after the presentation of the Delors report, the 
DNB opted for the creation of an institution on a European level to assure sufficient supervi-
sion of banks that operated in more than one country. There was also awareness of the fact 
that national supervision would be insufficient to control and correct the ‘policy and behavior’ 
of the ever increasing big banks throughout the European Community. Banking supervision 
could be part of the main tasks of the future European Central Bank, according to the DNB. 
And, of course, the DNB supported the ideas of more cooperation between the national au-
thorities of supervision, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.131 In 1991, the DNB for-
mulated the support for more harmonization and coordination again. Harmonization of the 
reports of the different central banks, was mentioned as one of the examples.132  
 The DNB was very much aware of the consequences of the developments of big bank-
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ing and the internationalizing of capital flows. Geographical borders became increasingly 
vague. The DNB recognized the very fact that a lot of improvement was made on enhancing 
international coordination and harmonization of supervision. In addition, the European Com-
munity should also cooperate with the rest of the world. An isolated policy within the Europe-
an Community would be insufficient.133 In addition the SER argues that there is a strong need 
to bring the jurisdiction with regard to financial activities to a common standard. In order to 
do so, the European Community could negotiate with the rest of world as one strong uniform 
power.134 
Lack of mechanisms in case of trouble 
Last, and in this case least, the lack of mechanism for crisis management. The advisory boards 
of the Dutch government did not take into account the options for crisis management. One 
could not find descriptions of scenarios in which things could go wrong. Transfers of money 
from one state to the other, or monetary financing could be options to stabilize the system and 
prevent a collapse (notice the creation of the European Stability Mechanism in 2011). The 
SER and WRR did elaborate on that.       
 The WRR explicitly stated that the ECB could never be a lender of last resort for gov-
ernments in need of credit.135 Indirectly, the SER was also against the principle of ‘fiscal’ 
transfers of money from one country to the other. The SER warned for the fact that the Delors 
Plan offered options for extra financial support for countries that, due to the creation of the 
EMU, would lose the exchange rate instrument. That is to say that these (southern) countries 
could not devaluate anymore after the creation of a common currency. Delors opted for finan-
cial support for these countries. Structural funds were a good option to enhance competitive-
ness, but permanent or regular fiscal transfers were no option.136     
 The SER was also very clear about problems concerning excessive deficit spending 
and too high debt to GDP ratios: no extra financial support.137 The approach of the SER em-
phasized prevention of problems and gave less options to solve problems. The committee rec-
ognized the inability of the market to discipline member states that break the rules with regard 
to deficit spending. The Delors Report summarized that problem: ‘However, experience sug-
gests that market perceptions do not necessarily provide strong and compelling signals and 
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that access to a large capital market may for some time even facilitate the financing of eco-
nomic imbalances. Rather than leading to a gradual adaptation of borrowing costs, market 
views about the creditworthiness of official borrowers tend to change abruptly and result in 
the .closure of access to market financing. The constraints imposed by market forces might 
either be too slow and weak or too sudden and disruptive.’138 The SER agreed with that and 
argued that it was of utmost importance to limit the possibilities of excessive deficit spending. 
So again: it was all about prevention. The SER supported the ‘no bail-out’ clause; member 
states should be responsible for their own finances. Monetary financing and indirect monetary 
financing (borrowing money from outside the Eurozone) should be limited by formulating 
binding rules.139 
Summarizing table 2 
Design failures Part of aca-
demic litera-
ture? 
Reported by the advisory boards and 
DNB? 
1. Too intergovernmental, causing in-
sufficient compliance with the (fiscal) 
rules 
Yes Yes. Strict interpretation of the criteria, 
though focus on coordination. 
2. Too much focus on budgets, less on 
other macro-economic imbalances  
Yes, the OCA 
theory 
Yes, focus on convergence and alterna-
tive adjustment mechanisms (based on 
subsidiarity) 
3. Financial integration, though mainte-
nance of national supervision 
Yes, though not 
explicit ‘bank-
ing union’ 
Yes, but DNB only concerned with 
this. Focus on harmonization and coor-
dination and cross-border banking. 
4. Lack of crisis management and 
mechanisms 
No No, explicit against fiscal transfer and 
monetary financing 
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V. The attitude of the Dutch government vis-à-vis the design failures 
Last but not least a short history about  the position of the Dutch government with regard to 
design failures. One basis of the preceding chapter, we might argue that the Dutch govern-
ment could know that the architecture would be insufficient to become a stable house for the 
common currency. This chapter will elaborate on the question to what extent these insights 
were transmitted into official statements of the Dutch government. Thus this chapter will not 
elaborate on the general position of the Dutch government during the different intergovern-
mental conferences of Strasbourg, Madrid, Rome and Maastricht. Once the archives contain-
ing information about the negotiations will be open, we will be able to reveal the rationale 
behind the (changing) positions and statements during the negotiations. Of course, we will 
also need interviews with all the leaders and diplomats involved in the negotiations at the dif-
ferent intergovernmental conferences at the time. 
General observations 
The second chapter was about the most controversial points during the negotiations towards 
the final draft of Maastricht: the convergence criteria, the time-path and the transfer of sover-
eignty. The negotiations were characterized by a dichotomy between the German on the one 
hand and the French on the other. The Germans and the Dutch supported the economist ap-
proach; that is to say that a certain level of convergence would be required in order to move 
on to the next steps of the EMU. The French and other southern countries supported the ideas 
of monetarists; they wanted to stick to a time-path and argued that the creation of the institu-
tions would automatically lead to convergence. For instance during the Summit of Rome in 
October 1990 the French and the Germans clashed on the issues concerning the transfer of 
sovereignty and setting a definitive time-path.140In general the Dutch supported the ideas of 
the Germans, but they were really eager to successfully establish the economic and monetary 
union.141 As a small country, it was sometimes rather difficult to expose its own ideas about 
how to create the common currency. For instance the ‘Miljoenennota’ of 1992, presented in 
September 1991, did not emphasize the opinion of the Dutch government; information about 
the creation of the EMU reflected more or less on the negotiations.142   
 Before we are going to take a look at the technical parts of the story, we might observe 
that the Dutch government did not go very often into detail about all the technical parts of the 
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design of the new Treaty. Just like the advises and policy papers of the advisory boards, most 
of the statements on the creation of the architecture of the EMU were a reaction on the origi-
nal plan of Jacques Delors. This report was rather vague in many aspects, and not about all 
details, and mainly focused on the entry criteria. As we saw before, the design failures are 
more about the situation after the start of the economic and monetary union; further integra-
tion, surveillance, macro-economic imbalances and crisis management. However the content 
of the statements of the government and the official opinions of the government contained 
commentaries and ideas about the general rationale behind, and the overall architecture of the 
EMU. It seemed that more technical details were left to specialists, technocrats and special-
ized civil servants. Nevertheless it is possible to distil some information with regard to design 
failures from the literature and official documents like the ‘Miljoenennota’ and letters of the 
ministers to commissions of the Dutch Parliament. We will take a  brief look at these state-
ments and ideas. Again categorized. 
Too intergovernmental 
And although the advisory boards, like the SER, advised to formulate very strict rules and 
standards, Wim Kok stated that the application of the criteria should be not ‘mechanical’. 
During the Dutch presidency the Dutch opted for strict application of the criteria and even 
suggested to divide the potential participant into two groups; one group that could start if all 
the criteria would met, and the other countries that not yet fulfilled the criteria; these countries 
should postpone membership. However, Kok withdrew these suggestions after protests of the 
Commission and Italy and France.143 The interpretation of the criteria became very loose in 
general. And the assessment of the policy plans and results of the participating states re-
mained on a rather intergovernmental level. The process and the willingness of participating 
states was more or less sufficient, as long as the trend towards meeting the target was main-
tained. Kok argued that long-term perspectives regarding economic and budgetary develop-
ments should be part of an overall assessment.144 Of course, this leaves some room for crea-
tive interpretations of the criteria.         
 In accordance with the Delors Plan, the Dutch government argued that the creation of 
supranational powers to control the budgets was not desirable. Based on the principle of sub-
sidiarity the policy should be up to the member states.145 In 1991, the Dutch government al-
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ready mentioned some of the possible criteria regarding budgetary policy. And sanctions 
should be part of the solutions to maintain fiscal discipline. The Dutch seemed very much 
aware of its own problematic situation of high deficit spending and wanted to maintain budg-
etary policy on a national level, as long as they could operate within the bandwidths of the 
criteria. Surveillance to maintain the criteria should be up to the EC Council of Ministers. 
They should signalize problems and decide on the actions; more or less based on a confiden-
tial approach of peer pressure. The governments of the member states had to judge about each 
other’s performance. All in all this seems rather intergovernmental.146    
 Then something about the role of the European Parliament with regard to supervision 
and controlling decisions and proposals concerning the EMU. A strong position of the Euro-
pean Parliament could mean a more supranational approach. During the process of negotia-
tions the Dutch opted for more power for the European Parliament. They supported the Bel-
gians in order to try to place the EMU under the normal procedures of the Treaty of Rome. 
However, during the process of negotiations the minster of financial affairs Wim Kok argued 
it was desirable to enhance the powers of the Parliament, but there were some problems. Ac-
cording to Kok member states would be less willing to work and talk about their national po-
sitions if the role of the Parliament is too big. The approach should be confidential. So multi-
lateral surveillance remained on the level of the Council, and decision-making on a rather 
intergovernmental level.147  
Macro-economic imbalances 
The Dutch government did not expose their views on how to prevent macro-economic imbal-
ances. The focus of the documents and statements was often on deficit spending and debt lev-
els. However, we can trace some awareness of imbalances and possible alternative adjustment 
mechanisms. The Dutch government emphasized regularly the need for more economic con-
vergence, and avoiding economic imbalances. Nevertheless, the Dutch government remained 
very vague about how to avoid these imbalances.148 Budgets seemed to be the core business 
concerning the question of more convergence. More economic convergence was a work in 
progress, ever since the creation of the internal market. The creation of the EMU was just 
another step, and should enhance the attempt for more convergence.149 The Dutch Parliament 
also mainly focused on reducing deficit spending to meet the targets. Wage and price policies, 
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and fiscal policies in order to counteract imbalances were of less concern.150   
 The ‘Miljoenennota’ of 1990 elaborated on the strong need for more economic con-
vergence. Nevertheless, the Dutch government hammered again mainly on discipline regard-
ing the budgets of the participating states. The Dutch government was very much aware of the 
high labor costs in the Netherland comparing to some other states. The government opted for 
moderating increases of the wages and wanted to focus on producing high-tech products and 
services.151 The dangers of using the tools of wage and fiscal policies in order to maintains the 
competitive position, were social and fiscal dumping. Piet Dankert, Secretary of State of For-
eign Affairs, emphasized that some level of policy coordination on a European level was re-
quired to prevent these problems. The market could cause a race to the bottom.152 
 Then the issue of harmonizing fiscal policies. The Dutch government wanted to main-
tain the responsibilities of social policies (also social security system) on a national level, 
based on the principle of subsidiarity.153 The Dutch were very much aware of the huge differ-
ences within the union concerning fiscal policies due to different standards of for instance 
social  security. The harmonization of indirect taxes, in order to complete the internal market, 
were regarded as necessary, but the Dutch approach concerning harmonization of direct taxes 
was very reluctant.154          
 All in all it looked like the Dutch government did not really bother about potential 
imbalances and tools to correct these imbalances. Convergence was the main issue, whatever 
that meant. For instance, after the conference of Apeldoorn in September 1991, Kok stated 
that the Dutch government would hand in a convergence program. But, the content of the 
convergence programs remained rather vague and the programs of the other states were only 
allowed to circulate within the European Council.155 
Financial integration, supervision on a national level 
Cross-border capital and international banking were on the agenda of the Dutch government 
during the years before the Treaty of Maastricht. In general the Dutch government was very 
much in favor of more cooperation between the national supervisors. Already in 1987 the 
Minister of Financial Affairs Onno Ruding, about attempts on a European level to enhance 
legislation for criteria regarding supervision of the financial system, mutual recognition and 
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cooperation between member states of the internal market.156 Besides initiatives to enhance 
mutual recognition, common standards and rules, supervision on a supranational level was not 
really a topic of discussion. It was more about cooperation between the supervisory institu-
tions.  In 1990, for instance, minister of financial affairs Wim Kok informed the national par-
liaments about a legislative proposal to broaden the options to transfer information between 
national supervisory bodies.157        
 Supranational supervision was often connected to the creation of the ECB. In Decem-
ber 1988 the Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, was very clear about the role of the ECB. 
Berend-Jan van Voorst tot Voorst argued that the ECB should focus on price-stability, that is 
to say low inflation, and exchange-rate stability. Furthermore, one of the other primary goals 
of the ECB should be supervising and the banking and credit system.158 However, two years 
later the Dutch government was less clear about supervision of the banks. In 1990 the Minis-
ter of Financial Affairs declared that supervision of the banks should be remained on a nation-
al level. Issues regarding cross border effects of banking and the application of harmonizing 
measures should probably up to the ECB. Whether the role of the ECB should be coordinating 
or advisory remained rather vague.159  
Lack of crisis management and crisis mechanisms 
First we might observe that, just like the advisory boards, the Dutch government did not fore-
see the option that things could go wrong. The Dutch government did not expose ideas about 
tools and mechanisms  which could prevent a collapse of the system. Maybe a collapse was 
regarded as unrealistic and was never in the minds of the designers of the Treaty and the 
Dutch government. After the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis ad hoc measures had to be taken 
in order to stabilize the system – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) for instance. 
 Nevertheless, the Dutch government was very clear about monetary financing: no 
monetary financing in case of emergency.160  In 1990 the Dutch government repeated its 
statement about the Delors Report concerning transfers of money from more wealthy to less 
wealthy states. The Dutch government argues that these suggested transfers were not desirable. 
According to the Dutch, transfers that would not lead to structural improvements, could ena-
ble receiving member states to maintain their levels of labor unit costs. So despite transfers, 
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the level of competitiveness would remain low, and more and more transfers would be re-
quired. The Dutch government argued that the less competitive states should improve their 
performance by structural reforms; that should not be the task of the Eurozone as whole.161 So 
member states should be responsible for their own stability (that is to say to remain competi-
tive). And maybe this attitude explains the lack of collective crisis management and mecha-
nisms.              
Summarizing table 3 
Design failures Part of 
academic 
literature? 
Reported by the advi-
sory boards and 
DNB? 
Statement of the 
Dutch government? 
1.Too intergovernmental, 
causing insufficient compli-
ance with the (fiscal) rules 
Yes Yes. Strict interpreta-
tion of the criteria, 
though focus on coor-
dination. 
Strict interpretation of 
the criteria on the one 
hand, but leaves space 
for interpretation on the 
other. Approach rather 
intergovernmental 
2. Too much focus on budg-
ets, less on other macro-
economic imbalances  
Yes, the 
OCA theo-
ry 
Yes, focus on conver-
gence and alternative 
adjustment mecha-
nisms (based on sub-
sidiarity) 
Focus on the budgets, 
but also convergence 
(sometimes vague) to 
avoid imbalances. 
Awareness of alterna-
tive adjustment mecha-
nisms (up to the states 
to use these tools) 
3. Financial integration, 
though maintenance of na-
tional supervision 
Yes, 
though not 
explicit 
‘banking 
union’ 
Yes, but DNB only 
concerned with this. 
Focus on harmoniza-
tion and coordination 
and cross-border bank-
ing. 
First in favor of supra-
national institutions, 
but later preference of 
subsidiarity and focus 
on coordination, coop-
eration and harmoniza-
tion. 
4. Lack of crisis management 
and mechanisms 
No No, explicit against 
fiscal transfer and 
monetary financing 
No crisis management 
and mechanisms. Ex-
plicit against monetary 
financing and fiscal 
transfers 
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Conclusion 
The EMU proved to be a house without a roof. The Treaty of Maastricht and the architecture 
of the common currency were too weak to prevent a severe crisis. According to many scholars 
and politicians, the Maastricht Treaty was more or less the beginning of a long process of im-
proving and enhancing the architecture.  For instance the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 
was one of the major improvements. Nevertheless, this was not simply enough if we consider 
the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis. The construction of the EMU building remained unfin-
ished.162  However, the Eurozone did not collapse and was saved by implementing ad hoc 
measures, structural measures and different tools that were not part of the original design.
 Many politicians, academics and scholars and even members of the cabinets of Ruud 
Lubbers admitted that the original architecture contained different design failures. The Maas-
tricht Treaty was more or less an unfinished work in progress. But could we blame the Dutch 
government? The first chapter mentioned a recent article in the Dutch newspaper Volkskrant; 
the authors plead for intense research in order to find out whether the former Dutch govern-
ments of Lubbers did know information concerning the risks and design failures.163 This the-
sis is more or less a first attempt to find answers on this question. This research elaborated on 
the question to what extent the Dutch government was informed about the design failures by 
the advisory boards and the Dutch Central Bank. And how these insights and observations 
were translated into official statements.        
 The preceding three chapters were about these question. Let us sum up the main ob-
servations. With exception of the design failure regarding the lack of crisis management, all 
failures could be traced in contemporary literature and academic discussions. With regard to 
the lack of crisis management and tools, we might conclude that academics and the advisory 
boards could not predict the severe repercussions and problems that endangered the existence 
of the Eurozone as a whole. So we can’t blame the government for that. With regard to the 
intergovernmental approach: the literature and the advisory boards warned the Dutch govern-
ment for creative interpretations of the Treaty. In some cases the Dutch government defended 
these principles, but in the end, Lubbers, Kok and others left space for interpretation and not 
complying with the rules. With regard to the focus on the budgets, thereby neglecting other 
macro-economic imbalances, we might conclude that the academic literature mentioned the 
need for enhancing the adjustment mechanisms. The advisory boards and the DNB also 
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warned for imbalances. And although these boards elaborated on the OCA theory and the im-
balances, there was much stress on ‘vague’ coordination and convergence. The Dutch gov-
ernment, in turn, was aware of the dangers of imbalances, but focused very much on the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity. It was up to the states to remain competitive. Concerning international 
supervision of the financial system we might say that the academic world notified the incom-
patibility of liberalization, increasing big banking and free movement of large amounts of 
capital on the one hand, and national supervision on the other. The DNB opted for more coor-
dination and harmonization, just like the Dutch government. Both parties mentioned at some 
point that the ECB could play a role on a supranational level, but later they opted again for 
more harmonization and coordination of the basis of subsidiarity.    
 All in all we might conclude that both the advisory boards and the Dutch governments 
did not had very clear ideas about the potential design failures. The Dutch government could 
know some of the design faults. Both were aware of potential problems, but focused very 
much on rather intergovernmental ways to prevent problems: coordination, harmonization, 
convergence and other terminology was common sense. But main approach was rather inter-
governmental, non-compulsory and based on subsidiarity. Nevertheless, it seems that the gov-
ernment could not predict the severe crisis due to the weak architecture. The absence of crisis 
management, firewalls and other tools in the statements and documents of the government 
and, ultimately, the Treaty might explain that fact.      
 Although this is the end of this thesis, this is not the end of the research concerning 
this topic. In particular, I left out the dynamics of the negotiations. This could be another part 
of the story. But why did it happen? We could only speculate. As far as I could judge, it 
seems that the Dutch politicians were very eager to reconcile the French monetarists and the 
German economists. That meant too much focus on issues like the time-path and convergence 
criteria during the negotiations. And perhaps, more technical details like alternative adjust-
ment mechanisms were ignored or neglected. Anyway, the Dutch were very eager to find 
compromise in Maastricht. Or was it the speed of the process? After the presentation of the 
Delors Report and due to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the process of transforming the internal 
market – not yet completed at that time – into the Economic and Monetary Union was at full 
speed; maybe too fast. And what about the personal intentions of political leaders? Did they 
want to succeed at all costs?         
 However, we could speculate for ages about the causes of the incomplete and instable 
architecture of the EMU. Once the archives will open, and all the stakeholders like Kok, Lub-
bers and Maas and other diplomats are willing to talk about the (technical) negotiations we 
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might eventually reconstruct why the design failures could occur in the original architecture 
of the EMU. So, to be continued... 
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